June 21-22 is the peak of the year, it marks the turn of the Sun for winter and is called the Kupala holiday. This turn of the Sun, dividing the year into two halves, from ancient times was accompanied by a special celebration.

The history of Kupala goes back millennia. The union of fire, water, earth and sky is the name of the summer solstice. The main sacrament of the Kupala holidays begins on the night of June 21-22. During the day, wreaths are collected and weaved, and at night they make offerings to fire and water, earth and sky, dance around the fire and sing songs. By jumping over a fire and dancing on coals, a fiery purification is carried out. During this period, water is filled with miraculous power, capable of healing, protecting, attracting, giving health, beauty and tranquility. Astronomically, on July 2, the Earth passes perihelion. Perihelion is the point of the Earth's orbit farthest from the Sun. At noon, the Sun's height above the horizon is greatest. The sun for a short time becomes in a special position, symbolizing unity with God. Three days later - from 5 to 7 July - all the waters of the Earth are charged with a special, miraculous power. The Sun, as the face of God, sends its divine grace through the element of Water. A person can receive spiritual illumination directly from God.

Midsummer traditions

According to the ancient idea, on the night of Kupala, Perun went to battle with the wither demon, stopping the chariot of the Sun at a heavenly height, opened the hidden treasures in the cloudy rocks and tempered the agonizing heat with rainy showers. Perun's weapon was an oak, with which he smashed evil spirits, turning it upside down. Oak - when read "upside down" sounds - bud (s)! The image of the oak as a family tree, the tree of life carries the concept of the strength of the spirit and the strength of the body, calling for physical perfection and procreation. Therefore, one of the oldest methods of sorcery (magic) on the summer solstice was actions around an oak tree, in oak groves, with acorns and oak bark. For example, add a decoction of oak leaves and branches to the water for bathing children - for the strength of the body, for the amulet. Acorns serve as the most ancient amulet: put them in a bag and hang them near the child's bed. It is no coincidence that the people have a custom to bless love unions that arise during the summer solstice, and children conceived at this time are considered to be under the special protection of the Family. This holiday is dedicated to taking care of the physical body, the purity and integrity of the body's energy shell. Therefore, they collect herbs, make amulets from evil force, remove damage, the evil eye, in other words - align the energy cocoon. The astral body of a person, which controls emotions and psyche, during this period becomes, on the one hand, very vulnerable and malleable, on the other hand, it is ready for the perception of the new, the disclosure of the subtlest spiritual qualities, the recruitment of new strength and qualitative transformation. A week after Trinity (in June), the Peter Lent begins, which ends on July 12. For the correct conduct of Peter's fast, it is recommended not only to observe the restriction in food, but to focus on the spiritual side of fasting - to direct your thoughts to God, to confess and receive communion. As you can see, both in the pagan and in the Christian tradition, during the period of the Earth's passage of perihelion and solstice, they call for spiritual and physical purification, for the striving of the soul towards the light and God.

What does the summer solstice bring to people?

Those who prove themselves worthy of honor discover treasures - the secrets of the Earth. Dreaming prophetic dreams and dreams from the future. This is one of the most magical periods of time. Desires are made, the future is corrected - through direct contact of a person with the elemental forces of the Earth. Now this interaction is the most accessible, easy and strongly tangible. You can enlist the support of the invisible forces of nature - if you prove to be pure in soul and open to light. For this, all kinds of Kupala rituals have been invented - jumping over fire, bathing in the river at sunrise, putting on wreaths of flowers and herbal amulets on the head. Wreaths drive sorrow, anxiety, evil thoughts, unpleasant memories that poison the soul, i.e. enlighten mind, thoughts and clear memory. If there is no way to spend the summer solstice in nature, visit the city park in the evening at sunset or in the morning at sunrise. Find a beautiful oak or birch. Talk to a tree, ask him to participate in your destiny as a talisman, pick a few leaves - this will be your amulet throughout the year. Dry leaves can be put in a bag (made of cloth) and put into a pillow.

There are many contradictory versions about what the Soviet leadership did on the last night before the attack by the German troops, what decisions it made. It is unlikely that you will ever be able to dot all the i's, but you can try to present a plausible picture.

Was the attack "treacherous" and "sudden"

The fact that a military clash between the USSR and Germany was inevitable in the near future became obvious to the leadership of the USSR long before the summer of 1941. The fact that the USSR was preparing for a big war on the western border is obvious from a variety of data. If we accept the version that the USSR was preparing for a defensive war, then except, as with Germany, there was no one to fight there. If the USSR itself was preparing to start a liberation campaign in Europe, then the question of "surprise" disappears all the more. And, of course, Stalin, Molotov and other top communists were sophisticated enough in politics to trust the leader of the imperialist state, so there was no "treachery" either.

But the question remains: was the German attack on June 22 a surprise? Here opinions differ, and each historian cites as a "decisive argument" only those evidence that suits him. Some say that Stalin ignored all signals about the imminent invasion of the Wehrmacht. They explain this in different ways: someone believes that Stalin believed Hitler's peace-loving assurances (which is absurd), someone - that the German attack ruined Stalin's own plans to start the war, and he did not want to believe it (which, too, at least strange).

Others are trying to prove that Stalin did everything in his power to prepare for war, and the generals, including Zhukov, ignored his orders, as they allegedly wanted to expose the Red Army to severe defeats and against this background to overthrow Stalin. Analysis of this version obviously goes beyond the scope of historiography and falls within the competence of psychiatry.

Still others most reasonably believe that the hypotheses that put either Stalin or his subordinates to be the culprits of the catastrophe of June 22 have nothing to do with a complex reality in which everyone could easily make mistakes in assessing the situation. But the most important thing that should be paid attention to - we still do not know exactly not only the pre-war plans of the Soviet leadership, but also its decisions on that fateful night.

You shouldn't believe everything in a memoir.

Thanks to the authority of the "Chief Marshal of Victory", most historians uncritically perceived his version of the events of June 21-22. Late in the evening of June 21, under the influence of information from the border about active movements of German troops, Stalin heeded the persuasions of the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov and People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko and agreed to issue "directive number 1" on bringing the troops of the border districts on alert. However, according to this version, the directive was issued too late to have time to carry out all the necessary preparatory measures. Therefore, the outbreak of the war caught most of the Soviet troops by surprise.

After the outbreak of hostilities, at 7:15 am on June 22, at the suggestion of Zhukov, directive No. 2 was issued to repulse the invading enemy with all forces. Finally, on the afternoon of June 22, directive No. 3 was sent to the troops, prescribing the infliction of counterattacks on the enemy and the transfer of the war to enemy territory.

In fact, it is completely incomprehensible why it was necessary to issue directive No. 2, if military operations were already underway. But that's not even the main thing. All this numbering of particularly important documents makes one doubt whether they were invented (including their archival copies) retroactively. Which body issued these directives? Neither the GKO nor the Supreme Command Headquarters had yet been created at that time. Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense and directives of the General Staff were assigned serial numbers starting from January 1 of each year. Further, if we consider that the directive № № 1 means "the first military", then after the directive № 3 this numbering for some reason has no continuation.

It is pertinent to recall that, setting out in his memoirs the circumstances of his resignation from the post of chief of the General Staff on July 29, 1941, Zhukov deliberately incorrectly described the strategic situation at that time, so that the readers had the impression that he had already warned Stalin about a possible catastrophe near Kiev.

Where were Stalin and members of the Politburo in general?

It would be fair to admit that historians still do not know the exact content and nature of the orders of the Soviet leadership to the troops on June 21-22. But this is still a trifle in comparison with the vagueness of where it was at all that night.

According to Zhukov's recollections, after issuing directive number 1, he left the Kremlin at about midnight, called Stalin at half past midnight and reported on the situation, and then called the leader again after the start of the first German bombing raids, at half past four in the morning, and Stalin had to be woken up. But Stalin, according to Zhukov, was in the Kremlin, and not in a nearby dacha, as many historians claim.

Zhukov's testimony is contradicted by the memoirs of A.G. Mikoyan and Sergo Beria, according to which the Politburo met all night and dispersed only at three o'clock in the morning on June 22, and soon, having learned about the beginning of the war, all members of the Politburo gathered again.

"Without a declaration of war ..."

It should be especially noted that neither Molotov nor his interviewer, a well-known patriotic publicist, had any motives to contradict the official version of the beginning of the war that had been ingrained in Soviet citizens for generations.

Molotov said that at two o'clock, when Stalin had a meeting, he was informed from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the German Ambassador von der Schulenburg wanted Molotov to receive him urgently in his office. Molotov's office was located in the same building as Stalin's office, but in a different wing. The members of the Politburo remained with Stalin. Between half past two and three in the morning, Schulenburg read out and handed Molotov a memorandum on Germany's declaration of war on the Soviet Union. This was evidently even before the outbreak of hostilities.

“Excuse me,” they will object, “but what about the fact that Germany attacked the USSR without declaring war ?!” That's it. Why on earth would Molotov, even decades later, lie if the version of an attack without a declaration of war was true? It is more logical to assume that this circumstance was not invented by either the Stalinist People's Commissar or Chuev. The German ambassador actually delivered a note of declaration of war before the German troops crossed the USSR border and even a few minutes before the first air raids. The Politburo, headed by Stalin, did meet that night later than two o'clock. What decisions it made is still to be determined.

On June 21, when only a few hours remained before the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, the Soviet government wanted to meet with the German authorities again and discuss the state of Soviet - German relations. The USSR Embassy in Berlin was ordered to arrange a meeting with the German government in order to prevent war through negotiations. All attempts by our diplomats to contact the government on Wilhelmstrasse have yielded no results. An urgent telegram came from Moscow about the immediate transfer to the German government of the above-mentioned important statement. But on Wilhelmstrasse "some important meeting" was taking place, which was attended by all the German leaders. This caused concern among the USSR diplomatic corps in Berlin. Throughout Saturday, June 21, they could not find any of the German leaders to contact.

“Meanwhile, in Moscow at half past nine in the evening on June 21, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov, on the instructions of the Soviet government, invited the German Ambassador Shelenburg to his place and informed him of the contents of the Soviet note on the numerous violations of the border by German aircraft. After that, the People's Commissar tried in vain to induce the ambassador to discuss with him the state of Soviet - German relations and to clarify Germany's claims to the Soviet Union. In particular, the question was posed to Schulenburg: what is Germany's dissatisfaction with the USSR, if any? Molotov also asked what explains the increased spread of rumors about an imminent war between Germany and the USSR, what explains the massive departure from Moscow in recent days of employees of the German embassy and their wives. In conclusion, Schulenburg was asked the question of what explains “the absence of any response from the German government to the reassuring and peaceful TASS report of June 14”. Schulenburg did not give any intelligible answer to these questions ... "

Already on the night of June 22, German planes bombed Mogilev, Lvov, Rovno, Grodno and other cities. Hitler's propaganda tried to create the impression that this war would be a short walk.

At 6 o'clock in the morning, in the USSR on the radio, there were no reports of the attack. The impression was created that Moscow did not know about this, or that Germany's actions were regarded as border skirmishes, only of a broader scale than before. In any case, all the stations transmitted first a gymnastics lesson, then a pioneer dawn, and finally, the latest news, which, as usual, began with news from the fields and messages about the achievements of the foremost workers. Only at 12 o'clock Moscow time did Molotov speak on the radio. He read out the statement of the Soviet government:

Today at 4 o'clock in the morning, without making any claims to the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country ... Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours!

Volunteers go to defend their homeland.

Much about the beginning of the Great Patriotic War is vague, confused and unclear. The main line of historical fundamentality, today, is that I.V. Stalin suppressed any initiative and stopped even talk of a possible invasion. As a result of his short-sighted policy, the first months of the war collapsed with a retreat to Moscow. But was J.V. Stalin really so guilty? And why exactly he and no one else. The accusation, which has been weighing on Joseph Vissarionovich for more than 50 years, is mainly based on the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, but there were other memories as well. Not trusting eyewitnesses of the events of the last hours of the world and the first hour of the war means making a choice to please one opinion. That's about the night from 21 to 22 June, and I want to provide you with memoirs, but two generals of the Great Patriotic War. With small comments (see: below).

So: this is how he writes about that night // Zhukov G. K. Memories and reflections. In 2 volumes - M .: Olma-Press, 2002 //. Vol. 1 chapter ten // The beginning of the war // Excerpt:

“On the night of June 22, 1941, all workers General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense were ordered to remain in their places. It was necessary as soon as possible to transmit to the districts a directive to bring the border troops on alert. At this time, the People's Commissar of Defense and I were in continuous negotiations with the commanders of the districts and chiefs of staff, who reported to us about the growing noise on the other side of the border. They received this information from the border guards and the forward units of the cover.
At about 24 o'clock on June 21, the commander of the Kiev district, M.P. Kirponos, who was at his command post in Ternopil, reported by high frequency that, in addition to the defector reported by General M.A. Purkaev, another German soldier appeared in our units - 222nd Infantry Regiment, 74th Infantry Division. He swam across the river, came to the border guards and said that at 4 o'clock the German troops would go over to the offensive. M.P.Kirponos was ordered to quickly transmit a directive to the troops on bringing them to combat readiness
Everything indicated that German troops were advancing closer to the border. We reported this to JV Stalin at 00.30 at night. He asked if the directive had been passed on to the districts. I answered in the affirmative.
After the death of JV Stalin, versions appeared that some commanders and their staffs on the night of June 22, suspecting nothing, were sleeping peacefully or having fun carelessly. This is not true. The last peaceful night was completely different.
As I said, the People's Commissar of Defense and I, upon returning from the Kremlin, repeatedly spoke on high frequency with the commanders of the districts F.I.Kuznetsov, D.G. Pavlov, M.P. Kirponos and their chiefs of staff, who, in addition to D.G. Pavlov, were at their command posts.
In the morning of June 22, N.F. Vatutin and I were at the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko in his office
At 0300 hours I received a call on HF from the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral FS Oktyabrsky, and said “The VNOS system of the fleet reports on the approach of a large number of unknown aircraft from the sea; the fleet is on full alert. I ask for instructions. "
I asked the admiral:
- Your decision?
- There is only one solution: to meet the planes with naval air defense fire.
After talking with S.K. Timoshenko, I replied to Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky:
- Take action and report to your People's Commissar.
At 0330 hours the Chief of Staff of the Western District, General V. Ye. Klimovskikh, reported on the German air raid on the cities of Belarus. About three minutes later, the Chief of Staff of the Kiev District, General M.A.Purkaev, reported on the air raid on the cities of Ukraine. At 3:40 a.m. the commander of the Baltic Military District, General F.I.Kuznetsov, called, who reported on the enemy air raids on Kaunas and other cities.
The People's Commissar ordered me to call J.V. Stalin. I'm calling. Nobody answers the phone. I call continuously. Finally I hear the sleepy voice of General Vlasik (head of the security department).
- Who's talking?
- Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. I ask you to urgently connect me with Comrade Stalin.
- What? Now?! - the head of security was amazed. - Comrade Stalin is sleeping.
- Wake up immediately: the Germans are bombing our cities, the war has begun.
There is silence for a few moments. Finally, they answered in a dull voice:
- Wait.
About three minutes later, J.V. Stalin approached the apparatus.
I reported the situation and asked for permission to start retaliatory hostilities. JV Stalin is silent. I can only hear his heavy breathing.
- Do you understand me?
Silence again.
- Will there be instructions? - I insist.
Finally, as if waking up, J.V. Stalin asked:
- Where is the Commissar?
- Speaks on HF with the Kiev district.
- Come with Tymoshenko to the Kremlin. Tell Poskrebyshev to summon all the members of the Politburo.
At 4 o'clock I again talked with FS Oktyabrsky. He reported in a calm tone:
- Enemy raid repulsed. An attempt to strike at our ships was thwarted. But there is destruction in the city.
I would like to note that the Black Sea Fleet, headed by Admiral FS Oktyabrsky, was one of our first formations that met an enemy attack in an organized manner. "

And this is how he writes about that night // Kuznetsov N.G. The day before. M., Site "Military Literature": militera.lib.ru // Night on June 22 // Excerpt with small abbreviations:

Saturday 21 June was almost the same as the previous day, full of alarms from the fleets. Before the weekend, we usually stopped work earlier, but that evening, my soul was restless, and I called home:
- Don't wait for me, I'll be late ...
Lull reigned in the institutions of the capital. On ordinary days, after 6 pm, lunchtime came: the managers went home - for three hours, then to sit at work until late at night. But on Saturday many went out of town. Business suffering subsided.
It was somehow especially quiet that evening. The phone didn't ring at all, as if it had been turned off. Even such "restless" People's Commissars as VA Malyshev and II Nosenko, with whom I was especially closely connected, did not remind of themselves by the question that had become habitual lately: "How are you?"
I was sitting in my office ... I was absentmindedly going through the papers. Thoughts could not focus on them. Not long before that I came across a review of the foreign press and TASS reports. Various newspapers wrote about the imminent war between the Russians and the Germans. They could not all agree!
My reflections were interrupted by the Deputy Chief of the Main Naval Staff V.A. Alafuzov. As always, he came with an evening report. The situation did not seem to have changed: it was still very hectic in the Baltic, and calmer on the Black Sea; nothing special happened in the North ... Once again, left alone, I called the Defense Commissar. - The People's Commissar has left, - they told me. The Chief of the General Staff was not there either. I decided to contact the fleets. First I talked to the commander of the Baltic Fleet V.F. Tributs, then with the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet I.D. Eliseev, with the commander in the North A.G. Golovko. Everyone was in place, everything seemed to be in order. The command posts have been deployed, the fleets have already been maintaining operational readiness No. 2 for two days. Only a limited number of Red Navy men and commanders have been released ashore. In Sevastopol, in the House of the Fleet, there is a concert, but the work is not weakening at the headquarters and at the command posts. Vigilantly watching the situation, observers report on everything noticed. So, the officer on duty at the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet noticed that the German transports, which were usually at sea at these hours, suddenly disappeared and took refuge in the Bulgarian and Romanian ports.
With some relief, I thought: since the commanders are in the field, they will be able to quickly orient themselves, if necessary. But why is there no information above? The People's Commissar for Defense and the General Staff know from our operational reports that the fleets are on high alert. The General Staff does not take such measures along its lines, and they do not say a word to us.
At 20.00 M.A. Vorontsov arrived, who had just arrived from Berlin.
That evening Mikhail Alexandrovich told me for about fifty minutes about what was happening in Germany. I repeated: the attack must be expected from hour to hour.
- So what does all this mean? - I asked him point blank.
- This is war! he replied without hesitation.
... An extraordinary report by V.A. Alafuzov. More and more reports were received from the fleets about unknown ships appearing near our shores, about violations of the airspace.
At about 11 pm the phone rang. I heard the voice of Marshal S.K.Timoshenko:
- There is very important information. Come to me. He quickly put the latest data on the situation in the fleets into a folder and, calling Alafuzov, went with him. A few minutes later we were already climbing to the second floor of a small mansion, where Timoshenko's office was temporarily located.
The Marshal dictated as he paced the room. It was still hot. General of the Army G.K. Zhukov was sitting at the table and writing something. In front of him lay several completed sheets of a large notepad for radiograms. Apparently, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff worked for quite a long time.
Semyon Konstantinovich noticed us and stopped. Briefly, without naming any sources, he said that a German attack on our country is considered possible.
Zhukov got up and showed us the telegram he had prepared for the border districts. I remember it was lengthy - on three sheets. It set out in detail what should be done by the troops in the event of an attack by Nazi Germany.

- Allowed.

Later I learned that the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were summoned on June 21 at about 5 pm to see J.V. Stalin. Consequently, already at that time, under the weight of irrefutable evidence, a decision was made: to bring the troops to full combat readiness and, in the event of an attack, repel it. This means that all this happened about eleven hours before the actual invasion of the enemy on our land.
This confirms once again: in the afternoon of June 21, JV Stalin recognized a clash with Germany, if not inevitable, then very, very likely. This is confirmed by the fact that that evening Moscow leaders A.S. Shcherbakov and V.P. Pronin were summoned to see J.V. Stalin. According to Vasily Prokhorovich Pronin, Stalin ordered this Saturday to detain the secretaries of the district committees in their places and forbid them to leave the city. "A German attack is possible," he warned. It is a pity that the remaining hours were not used to their maximum efficiency ...
The People's Commissariat reported to me: the emergency order has already been sent. It is very short - a signal by which the local authorities know what to do. Still, it takes some time for the telegram to pass through, and it is expensive. I take up the telephone receiver. The first call to the Baltic - to V.F. Tribets:
- Without waiting for the receipt of the telegram that has already been sent to you, transfer the fleet to operational readiness number one - combat. I repeat once again - combat. He, apparently, was waiting for my call. Just asked the question:
- Is it allowed to open fire in the event of a clear attack on ships or bases?
How many times have the sailors been reprimanded for "excessive zeal", and here it is: is it possible to shoot at the enemy? You can and should!
Commander of the Northern Fleet A.G. Golovko I also find myself on the spot. Its closest neighbor is Finland. What will she do if Germany attacks us? There are many reasons to believe that he will join the fascists. But there was still no way to say anything for sure.
- How to deal with Finns? - asks Arseny Grigorievich. - German planes fly from them to Polyarny.
- Open fire on violators of our airspace.
- Allow me to give orders?
- Good.
Chief of Staff I.D. Eliseev is on the wire in Sevastopol.
- You have not yet received a telegram to bring the fleet to combat readiness?
- No, - Ivan Dmitrievich answers.
I repeat to him what Tributsu and Golovko ordered.
- Act without delay! Report to the commander. Neither he nor I knew at that moment that Sevastopol was less than three hours from the first clash with the enemy.
After talking with the fleets, I was confident that the car started spinning. L.M. Haller looked in again. "What's new?" - I read on his face. I am talking about the instructions received from the People's Commissar of Defense. I was most worried about the situation in the Baltic, and Lev Mikhailovich was an old Baltic. We discuss with him the state of our forces there, look at the map ...
In those minutes, as is now known, at enemy airfields near the border, bombs were already being hung from planes, fascist tanks and ships were set in motion to strike the first blow. And we also thought: "Is it really a war?" Somewhere inside, a faint hope continued to glimmer: maybe it would be okay? Not done. Very soon we had to be convinced of that. But for now, the time of agonizing waiting has come for me. The fleets knew what to do. The contingency measures were precisely defined and practiced.
I mentally imagined how the order of actual readiness No. 1 had already been sent to the fleets and flotillas, then to the bases, formations, and now people are working silently and intensely, realizing the cost of every minute. I kept myself from picking up the phone again. Perhaps General Moltke was right in saying that, having given the order for mobilization, you can go to bed. Now the machine was running by itself. Superfluous orders can only interfere.
How events developed that night in the fleets, I learned later. My telephone conversation with V.F. Tributs ended at 23 hours 35 minutes. The combat log of the Baltic Fleet reads: “23 hours 37 minutes. Operational readiness number 1 has been announced. "
People were on the spot: the fleet had been on high alert since June 19. It took only two minutes for the actual preparations to begin to repel the enemy strike.
The Northern Fleet received the order telegram at 0 hours 56 minutes on 22 June. A few hours later, we received a report from Commander A. G. Golovko: "The Northern Fleet at 04:25 went to operational readiness No. 1."
This means that during this time the order not only reached the bases, airfields, ships and coastal batteries - they had already managed to prepare to repel the strike.
It's good that early in the evening - about 6 pm - I forced the commanders to take additional measures. They contacted their subordinates, warned them to be on the lookout. In Tallinn, Libau and on the Hanko peninsula, in Sevastopol and Odessa, Izmail and Pinsk, in Polyarny and on the Rybachy peninsula, the commanders of bases, garrisons, ships and units that Saturday evening forgot about rest with their family, hunting and fishing. All were in their garrisons and teams. Therefore, they were able to take action immediately.
Only twenty minutes passed after my conversation with Vice Admiral Tributs - the telegram had not yet reached Tallinn - and operational readiness number 1 was announced already at Hanko, at the Baltic base and in other places. This is again evidenced by the entries in the combat logs:
"The units of the coastal defense sector of the Libavsk and Vindavsk naval bases have been announced readiness number 1."
At 02:40 am, all ships and units of the fleet were already in fact in full combat readiness. No one was caught off guard.
Behind were weeks and months of intense, painstaking, sometimes annoying work, training, calculations and checks. Behind there were sleepless nights, unpleasant conversations, perhaps penalties imposed for slowness when people were alerted. Much was behind, but all the work, time and nerves spent - everything was justified a hundredfold in the minutes when the fleets confidently, harmoniously and without delay prepared to meet the enemy.
Sevastopol was the first to take the blow. Even if others entered the battle only an hour or two later, they already knew: the enemy had attacked our Motherland, the war had begun! Sevastopol met the attack prepared. The fleet command itself had to make the decision to open fire. It is worth recalling once again that only a week before that we were all assured: the war is not expected, talking about it is a provocation in order to understand how dramatic the situation was that night and what internal inhibition, hesitation, and uncertainty had to be overcome in ourselves people before giving such an order firmly and courageously.
Subsequently, I was told that on that Saturday, as on previous days, the ships were scattered in the Sevastopol Bay, with weapons ready for action. They were darkened, and from the shore it was impossible to distinguish their silhouettes on the black water. But the city on the evening of June 21 was still sparkling with lights. The boulevards and gardens were overwhelmed by a festive, elegant audience. "It seemed that nothing foreshadowed tragic events" - this is how N.T. Rybalko, who at that time was the operational duty officer at the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, wrote about this evening.
At about 23 o'clock, the chief of the fleet headquarters, Rear Admiral I.D. Eliseev, looked into the room of the operational duty officer.
“I’ll go home for a few minutes,” he said. N. T. Rybalko again saw the rear admiral less than two hours later, when he quickly entered the duty officer's room, holding a telegram in his hands.
"I remember her literally," writes N. T. Rybalko, "but I cannot vouch for the order in which the fleets were listed." Here is the telegram: “SF, KBF, Black Sea Fleet, PVF, DVF. Operational readiness # 1 immediately. Kuznetsov ". (PVF - Pinsk military flotilla. DVF - Danube military flotilla. - editor's note)
Immediately the main base was given the signal "Great gathering". And the city resounded with the roar of sirens, the signal shots of the batteries. The mouthpieces of the city radio broadcasting network began to speak, transmitting alarm signals. Sailors appeared in the streets, they fled to their ships.
And here is what Admiral ID Eliseev writes in his memoirs: “Taking into account the alarming situation, we agreed that at night the headquarters of the fleet must be attended by one of the senior commanders, vested with the right to make responsible decisions if necessary.
On the night of June 22, I, the chief of staff, took up such duty. Such is the tradition in the navy: duty from Saturday to Sunday is considered the most responsible.
At 01.03 a telegram was received from Moscow. In two minutes it was already on my table. Soon a telegram was handed over to the arriving fleet commander. It was the order of the People's Commissar of the Navy on the transfer of the fleet to operational readiness No. 1. Immediately, a previously worked out warning system was put into action. There were two ways to call the personnel: through informants (covertly) and by alarm. At first I ordered the first method to be used. But the headquarters began to receive reports that the transition to high readiness was not being carried out quickly enough. Then I ordered to play the basic alarm.
Operational readiness number 1 was announced by the fleet at 01:15 on June 22, 1941. "
The lights on the boulevards and in the windows of houses gradually began to go out. The city authorities and some commanders called the headquarters, asking in bewilderment:
- Why was it necessary to darken the city so hastily? After all, the fleet has just returned from training. Give people a little rest.
- It is necessary to darken immediately, - answered from the headquarters. An order followed to turn off the power plant switches. The city instantly plunged into such dense darkness, which can only be found in the south. Only one lighthouse continued to throw sheaves of light on the sea, especially bright in the ensuing darkness. Communication with the lighthouse was broken, maybe a saboteur did it. A messenger on a motorcycle rushed to the lighthouse through the dark city.
At the headquarters of the fleet, the packages that had been lying untouched until that fateful hour were opened. Machine-gun bursts were heard at the airfields - fighters tested live ammunition. Anti-aircraft gunners removed safety checks from their guns. In the dark, boats and barges were moving along the bay. The ships received shells, torpedoes and everything needed for battle. On the coastal batteries, they raised their heavy bodies with huge guns, preparing to cover the deployment of the fleet with fire.
The headquarters hastily recorded reports on the transition to combat readiness from the Danube military flotilla, from naval bases and ship formations.
"By about 0200 hours on June 22, the entire fleet was in readiness", - written by NT Rybalko.
At about 3 o'clock, the duty officer was informed that the SNIS and VNOS posts (SNIS - Observation and Communication Service. VNOS - Air Surveillance, Alert and Communication. - Editor's Note) hear the noise of aircraft engines. Rybalko reports this to ID Eliseev.
- Should we open fire on unknown planes? - Colonel Zhilin, the head of the air defense, calls.
“Report to the commander,” the chief of staff replies. Rybalko reports to the fleet commander. And then they have a conversation, which I reproduce according to the record of the attendant.
F.S. Oktyabrsky. Are our planes in the air?

F.S. Oktyabrsky. Follow the instructions.
I am citing the records of N.T. Rybalko literally, not only to characterize people. I would like to clarify how difficult it was to make the first decisions that meant the transition from peacetime to war. After all, the case concerned Sevastopol - the main naval base of the Black Sea Fleet. To give an order here to open fire with the entire air defense system against aircraft that were still unknown in those minutes is far from tantamount to opening fire at some border outpost, accustomed to all kinds of incidents. The command had a great responsibility: on the one hand, not to let the enemy pass with impunity, and on the other, not to cause unwanted complications. A little later, when all the fleets received a direct explanation that the war had begun, doubts and hesitation disappeared.
Naturally, such an answer could not satisfy the duty officer N.T. Rybalko, and he turned to the Chief of Staff of the Fleet I.D. Eliseev, who was standing next to him:
- What to answer to Colonel Zhilin?
“Give the order to open fire,” ID Eliseev said resolutely.
- Open fire! - N.T. Rybalko commanded the head of the air defense. But Colonel Zhilin was well aware of the risk associated with this.
“Keep in mind that you are solely responsible for this order. I'm putting it in the combat log, ”he replied, instead of uttering a short naval" Yes! "
- Write wherever you want, but open fire on the planes! - Rybalko is already almost shouting, starting to get nervous.
3 hours 07 minutes. German planes approached Sevastopol stealthily, at low altitude. Suddenly, searchlights immediately flashed, bright rays began to rummage across the sky. The anti-aircraft guns of the coastal batteries and ships began to speak. Several planes caught fire and began to fall. Others were in a hurry to dump their load. Their task was to block ships in the bays of Sevastopol, to prevent them from going to sea. The enemy did not succeed. The mines fell not on the fairway, but on the shore. Some hit the city and exploded there, destroying houses, causing fires and killing people.
The mines were parachuted, and many residents thought they were airborne troops. It was not surprising to mistake mines for soldiers in the dark. Unarmed Sevastopol residents, women and even children rushed to the landing site to grab the Nazis. But the mines exploded, and the number of victims grew. However, the raid was repulsed, and Sevastopol met the dawn on June 22 fully armed, bristling with guns that looked into the sky and into the sea.
In Moscow, dawn came a little earlier. At 3 o'clock everything was already visible. I lay down on the sofa, trying to imagine what was happening in the fleets. The dull ringing of the phone lifted me to my feet.
- Reporting by the commander of the Black Sea Fleet. By the unusually agitated voice of Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, I already understand that something out of the ordinary has happened.
- An air raid was made on Sevastopol. Anti-aircraft artillery repels the attack of the aircraft. Several bombs fell on the city ...
I look at my watch. 3 hours 15 minutes. That's when it started ... I no longer have any doubts - the war!
I immediately pick up the phone and dial the number of Stalin's office. The duty officer answers:

“I can’t help you,” he replies calmly and hangs up.
And I do not let go of the pipe. I called Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. I repeat word for word what Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky reported.
- Can you hear me?
- Yes, I can.
There is not even a shadow of doubt in Semyon Konstantinovich's voice, he does not ask me again. Perhaps I was not the first to break the news to him. He could receive similar information from the command of the districts.
Now is not the time to talk to the Defense Commissar about the situation in the fleets, about their readiness. He has enough to do.
For a few more minutes I did not leave the phone, again I called J.V. Stalin at different numbers, trying to get a personal conversation with him. Nothing comes out. I called the duty officer again:
- Please tell Comrade Stalin that German planes are bombing Sevastopol. This is war!
- I will report to whom I should, - the duty officer answers. A few minutes later I hear a call. An annoyed, annoyed voice sounds in the receiver:
- Do you understand what you are reporting? - This is G.M. Malenkov.
- I understand and report with full responsibility: the war has begun.
It seemed that there was a waste of time talking! We must act immediately: the war has already begun!
GM Malenkov hangs up the phone. He apparently did not believe me. Someone from the Kremlin called Sevastopol, rechecked my message.
The conversation with Malenkov showed that the hope of avoiding war still lived when the attack had already taken place and blood was shedding over the vast expanses of our Motherland. Apparently, the instructions given to the People's Commissar of Defense were therefore transmitted to the places without much haste, and the districts did not have time to receive them before the Nazis attacked.
After Malenkov's call, I still hoped that the government's instructions on the first actions in the conditions of the outbreak of war would follow. No instructions have been received.
I, on my own responsibility, ordered to give the fleets an official notification of the beginning of the war and of repelling enemy strikes by all means, on the basis of this, the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet, for example, already at 5:17 pm on June 22, announced to the fleet: “Germany has begun an attack on our bases and ports. By force of arms to repel any attempt to attack the enemy. "
At that moment, of course, it was necessary not only to "repel the attempts to attack", but to strike back at the enemy. But the fleet could not do this alone, they needed coordinated plans, a single leadership on the scale of all the Armed Forces.
The main naval headquarters conveyed another order to the fleets: "Immediately begin laying minefields according to the cover plan." I remember that the Balts asked for this even earlier, when they switched to readiness number 2, that is, on June 19. But I could not allow this - it went beyond my rights. Therefore, in the Baltic, this order was received at 0630 hours on June 22. The Baltic Sea Theater worried us more than others, and we wanted to make up for lost time. Then an additional order was given: "To lay mines around the clock, to use everything that is possible: destroyers and other ships." I remember that L.M. Haller personally called Tallinn and asked to speed up this operation: after all, several thousand mines had to be set up. The squadron commander, Rear Admiral D.D. Vdovichenko, went out with the detachment to cover the operation. With what risk, endurance and consciousness of their duty this dangerous operation was carried out, the commander of the minesag "Oka" NI Meshchersky wrote to me later ... ".

Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov are better known to the reader than the long-unpublished memoirs of Admiral Kuznetsov, where Georgy Konstantinovich looks like a decisive commander, but if you read inattentively:

“At 0300 hours I received a call on HF from the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky, and said“ The VNOS system of the fleet reports on the approach from the sea side of a large number of unknown aircraft; the fleet is on full alert. I ask for instructions. "
I asked the admiral:
- Your decision?
"There is only one solution: to meet the planes with naval air defense fire."

“The People's Commissar ordered me to call JV Stalin. Calling ... ".

Somehow this does not go well with the decisive conversation, which, according to Zhukov, he had with Stalin. The situation with the directives is also very vague, but about Zhukov's actions in this regard, it is better to read from Kuznetsov and compare.

In the memoirs of Admiral Kuznetsov, I repeated especially interesting moments that differ from those of Zhukov. I especially ask you to pay attention to the fact that already on Saturday 17th the order was given about readiness number 1, but Zhukov apparently wrote the directives “on three sheets” and it took him 6 hours to complete this most important task!

“Later I learned that the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were summoned on June 21 at about 5 pm to see JV Stalin. Consequently, already at that time, under the weight of irrefutable evidence, a decision was made: to bring the troops to full combat readiness and, in the event of an attack, repel it. This means that all this happened about eleven hours before the actual invasion of the enemy on our land.
Not so long ago, I had the opportunity to hear from General of the Army I.V. Tyulenev - at that time he was in command of the Moscow Military District - that on June 21, at about 2 pm, J.V. Stalin called him and demanded that the combat readiness of the air defense be increased.
This confirms once again: in the afternoon of June 21, JV Stalin recognized a clash with Germany, if not inevitable, then very, very likely. This is confirmed by the fact that that evening Moscow leaders A.S. Shcherbakov and V.P. Pronin were summoned to see J.V. Stalin. According to Vasily Prokhorovich Pronin, Stalin ordered this Saturday to detain the secretaries of the district committees in their places and forbid them to leave the city. "A German attack is possible," he warned. It is a pity that the remaining hours were not used with maximum efficiency ... ”.

In addition, during this period, neither the People's Commissar of Defense, nor the Chief of the General Staff was in place. In addition, I ask you to pay special attention to the actions of Kuznetsov

“Zhukov got up and showed us the telegram he had prepared for the border districts. I remember it was lengthy - on three sheets. It set out in detail what should be done by the troops in the event of an attack by Nazi Germany.
This telegram did not directly concern the fleets. After running through the text of the telegram, I asked:
- Is it allowed to use weapons in the event of an attack?
- Allowed.
I turn to Rear Admiral Alafuzov:
- Run to the headquarters and immediately instruct the fleets about full actual readiness, that is, readiness number one. Run!
There was no time to argue whether it was convenient for the admiral to run down the street. Vladimir Antonovich ran, I myself stayed for another minute, asked if I understood correctly that an attack could be expected that night. Yes, that's right, on the night of June 22nd. And it has already come! ..

Readiness number 1 for all flats and no directives, everything started on the ground in a matter of minutes, like a well-oiled mechanism. The sailors were the first to accept the battle at 3:15 am Sevastopol had already fought and they had time to prepare. Characteristic and interesting is the conversation of F.S. Oktyabrsky, to whom Zhukov credits the first hours of the war on the Black Sea and N.T. Rybalko.

"F.S. Oktyabrsky. Are our planes in the air?
N.T. Rybalko. Our planes are not there.
F.S. Oktyabrsky. Keep in mind, if there is at least one of our aircraft in the air, you will be shot tomorrow.
N.T. Rybalko. Comrade commander, what about the opening of fire?
F.S. Oktyabrsky. Follow the instructions. "

Not the possibility of the Commander of the Navy Kuznetsov! contacting Stalin through the attendant is striking, to say the least:

“I immediately pick up the phone and dial the number of Stalin’s office. The duty officer answers:
- Comrade Stalin is not, and where he is, I do not know.
“I have a message of exceptional importance, which I must immediately convey to Comrade Stalin personally,” I try to convince the duty officer.
"I can't help you," he calmly answers and hangs up. "

And much more….

The weather was great in Berlin on Saturday 21 June. Already in the morning the day promised to be hot, and many of our employees were preparing to leave the city in the afternoon - to the parks of Potsdam or to the Wannsee and Nicholassee lakes, where the swimming season was in full swing. Only a small group of diplomats had to stay in the city. In the morning an urgent telegram came from Moscow. The embassy was to immediately convey to the German government the above-mentioned important statement.

I was instructed to contact the Wilhelmstrasse, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was located in the grandiose palace of Bismarck's time, and to arrange a meeting of the embassy representatives with Ribbentrop. The officer on duty at the minister's secretariat replied that Ribbentrop was not in the city. A call to the First Deputy Minister, Secretary of State, Baron von Weizsacker, also failed. Hour after hour passed, but none of the responsible persons could be found. Only at noon did the director of the political department of the ministry, Verman, appear. But he only confirmed that neither Ribbentrop nor Weizsacker was in the ministry.

It seems that some important meeting is taking place at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Apparently, everything is there now, - explained Werman. - If you have an urgent matter, tell me, and I will try to contact the management ...

I replied that it was impossible, since the ambassador was instructed to convey the statement personally to the minister, and asked Werman to let Ribbentrop know about it ...

The case on which we sought a meeting with the minister could not be entrusted to secondary officials. After all, it was about a statement in which the German government was required to explain in connection with the concentration of German troops along the borders of the Soviet Union.

There were several phone calls from Moscow that day. We were rushed to carry out our assignment. But no matter how much we turned to the Foreign Office, the answer was the same: Ribbentrop is not there, and it is not known when he will be. He is out of reach, and he, they say, could not even be informed of our appeal.

By seven o'clock in the evening, everyone went home. I had to stay at the embassy and seek a meeting with Ribbentrop. Putting my desk clock in front of me, I decided to call Wilhelmstrasse meticulously, every 30 minutes.

Through the open window overlooking Unter den Linden, Berliners could be seen strolling in the middle of the street along a boulevard lined with young linden trees, as usual on Saturdays.

Girls and women in bright colorful dresses, men, mostly elderly, in dark old-fashioned suits. At the gates of the embassy, ​​leaning on the jamb of the gates, a policeman in an ugly Schutzman helmet was dozing ...

On my desk lay a large sheaf of newspapers - in the morning I could only skim through them. Now it was possible to read more closely. In the Nazi officialdom Volkischer Beobachter, several articles by Dietrich, the head of the press department of the German government, have been published recently. The press attaché of the embassy reported on them at one of our last internal press conferences. In these apparently inspired articles, Dietrich hit the spot all the time. He spoke of a certain threat that hung over the German Empire and which hinders the implementation of Hitler's plans to create a "thousand-year Reich". The author pointed out that the German people and government were forced, before embarking on the construction of such a Reich, to eliminate the threat that had arisen. Dietrich, of course, promoted this idea for a reason. I remembered his articles on the eve of Nazi Germany's attack on Yugoslavia in the first days of April 1941. Then he talked about the "sacred mission" of the German nation in Southeast Europe, recalled the campaign of Prince Eugene in the 18th century in Serbia, occupied at that time by the Turks, and quite transparently made it clear that now the same path must be taken by German soldiers. Now, in the light of the facts known to us about the preparations for the war in the East, Dietrich's articles on the "new threat" acquired a special meaning. It was hard to shake off the thought that the rumor circulating in Berlin, in which the last date of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union - June 22 - appeared, might be correct this time. It also seemed strange that we could not contact either Ribbentrop or his first deputy during the whole day, although usually, when the minister was not in town, Weizsacker was always ready to receive a representative of the embassy. And what is this important meeting at Hitler's headquarters, at which, according to Werman, all the Nazi leaders are? ..

When I called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again, the official who answered the phone politely said the stereotypical phrase:

I have still not been able to contact Herr Reichsminister. But I remember about your appeal and take action ...

To the remark that I would still have to bother him, since this was an urgent matter, my interlocutor kindly replied that this did not bother him at all, since he would be on duty at the ministry until morning. Again and again I called on Wilhelmstrasse, but to no avail ...

Suddenly, at 3 am, or at 5 am Moscow time (it was already Sunday, June 22), the phone rang. An unfamiliar voice announced that Reichsminister Joachim von Ribbentrop was waiting for Soviet representatives in his office at the Foreign Office on Wilhelmstrasse. Already from this barking unfamiliar voice, from the extremely official phraseology, something ominous breathed. But in answering, I pretended that we were talking about a meeting with the minister, which the Soviet embassy was seeking.

I don't know anything about your appeal, ”said the voice on the other end of the line. “I have only been instructed to convey that Reichsminister Ribbentrop is asking Soviet representatives to come to him immediately.

I noticed that it would take time to notify the ambassador and prepare the car, to which they replied:

The Reich Minister's personal car is already at the entrance of the Soviet embassy. The minister hopes that Soviet representatives will arrive immediately ...

Leaving the gates of the embassy mansion on Unter den Linden, we saw a black Mercedes limousine on the sidewalk. At the wheel was a chauffeur in a dark jacket and a cap with a large varnished visor. Sitting next to him was an officer from the Totenkopf SS Division. The crown of his cap was decorated with an emblem - a skull with crossed bones.

On the sidewalk, waiting for us, stood an official of the Foreign Ministry's protocol department in full dress. He opened the door for us with emphasized politeness. The ambassador and I, as an interpreter for this responsible conversation, sat in the back seat, the official settled down in a reclining chair. The car rushed down the deserted street. The Brandenburg Gate flashed to the right. Behind them, the rising sun has already covered the fresh greens of the Tiergarten with crimson. Everything foreshadowed a clear sunny day ...

As we drove out to Wilhelmstrasse, from a distance we saw a crowd outside the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although it was daylight, the cast-iron canopy was brightly lit by floodlights. Photo reporters, cameramen and journalists were bustling around. The official jumped out of the car first and opened the door wide. We left, blinded by the light of Jupiters and the flashes of magnesium lamps. An alarming thought flashed through my head - is it really a war? There was no other way to explain such a crowd on the Wilhelmstrasse, and even at night. Photo reporters and cameramen accompanied us relentlessly. Every now and then they ran ahead, clicking the locks, when we climbed the stairs covered with a thick carpet to the second floor. A long corridor led to the minister's apartment. Along it, stretched out, stood some people in uniform. At our appearance, they loudly clicked their heels, raising their hand up in a fascist greeting. Finally we turned right into the minister's office.

At the back of the room was a desk. In the opposite corner was a round table, most of which was occupied by a heavy lamp under a high shade. Several chairs were in disarray.

At first the hall seemed empty. Only at the desk sat Ribbentrop in his everyday gray-green ministerial uniform. Looking back, we saw in the corner, to the right of the door, a group of Nazi officials. When we walked across the room towards Ribbentrop, these people did not budge. Throughout the entire conversation, they remained there, at a considerable distance from us. Apparently, they did not even hear what Ribbentrop was saying: so large was this old high hall, which, according to the plan of its owner, was supposed to emphasize the importance of the person of Hitler's foreign minister.

When we got close to desk Ribbentrop stood up, silently nodded his head, held out his hand and invited him to follow him to the opposite corner of the room at a round table. Ribbentrop had a swollen crimson face and dull, as if stopped, inflamed eyes. He walked in front of us, head down and staggering a little. "Isn't he drunk?" - flashed through my head.

After we sat down at the round table and Ribbentrop began to speak, my assumption was confirmed. He, apparently, really drank thoroughly.

The Soviet ambassador was never able to present our statement, the text of which we took with us. Ribbentrop, raising his voice, said that now it will be about something completely different. Stumbling over almost every word, he began to explain in a rather confused way that the German government had data on the increased concentration of Soviet troops on the German border. Ignoring the fact that over the past weeks, the Soviet embassy, ​​on behalf of Moscow, had repeatedly drawn the attention of the German side to the egregious cases of violations of the Soviet Union border by German soldiers and aircraft, Ribbentrop said that Soviet servicemen violated the German border and invaded German territory, although such facts in reality was not.

Ribbentrop further explained that he summarized the contents of Hitler's memorandum, the text of which he immediately handed over to us. Then Ribbentrop said that the German government viewed the situation as a threat to Germany at a time when she was leading a life-and-death war with the Anglo-Saxons. All this, said Ribbentrop, is regarded by the German government and personally by the Fuehrer as an intention of the Soviet Union to stab the German people in the back. The Fuhrer could not tolerate such a threat and decided to take measures to protect the life and safety of the German nation. The Fuhrer's decision is final. An hour ago, German troops crossed the border of the Soviet Union.

Then Ribbentrop began to assure that these actions of Germany are not aggression, but only defensive measures. After that Ribbentrop got up and stretched out to his full height, trying to give himself a solemn air. But his voice clearly lacked firmness and confidence when he uttered the last phrase:

The Fuehrer instructed me to officially announce these defensive measures ...

We also got up. The conversation was over. Now we knew that the shells were already bursting on our land. After the robbery attack had taken place, the war was officially declared ... Nothing could be changed at this point. Before leaving, the Soviet ambassador said:

This is a blatant, unprovoked aggression. You will still regret that you have carried out a robbery attack on the Soviet Union. You will pay dearly for this ...

We turned and headed for the exit. And then the unexpected happened. Ribbentrop, the seed, hastened after us. He became a patter, in a whisper, as if he was personally against this decision of the Fuhrer. He even allegedly dissuaded Hitler from attacking the Soviet Union. Personally, he, Ribbentrop, considers it insane. But there was nothing he could do. Hitler made this decision, he did not want to listen to anyone ...

Tell Moscow that I was against the attack, - we heard the last words of the Reich Minister, when we were already going out into the corridor ...

The camera shutters clicked again, the movie cameras began to buzz. The sun was shining brightly on the street where we were greeted by a crowd of reporters. We approached the black limousine, which was still at the entrance, waiting for us.

We were silent on the way to the embassy. But my thought involuntarily returned to the scene just played out in the Nazi minister's office. Why was he so nervous, this fascist thug, who, like other Hitlerite bosses, was a fierce enemy of communism and treated our country and the Soviet people with pathological hatred? Where has his insolent self-confidence gone? Of course, he lied, claiming that he discouraged Hitler from attacking the Soviet Union. But what did his last words mean? Then we couldn't have an answer. And now, remembering all this, you begin to think that Ribbentrop, at that fateful moment when he officially announced the decision that ultimately led to the death of the Hitlerite Reich, may have stirred some gloomy premonition ... then an extra dose of alcohol? ..

Having approached the embassy, ​​we noticed that the building was heavily guarded. Instead of the one policeman usually at the gate, there was now a line of soldiers in SS uniforms lined up along the sidewalk.

The embassy was waiting for us impatiently. While there they probably did not know why Ribbentrop had called us, but one sign made everyone wary: as soon as we left for Wilhelmstrasse, the embassy's connection with the outside world was interrupted - not a single telephone worked ...

At 6 o'clock in the morning Moscow time, we turned on the receiver, waiting for what Moscow would say. But all our stations transmitted first a gymnastics lesson, then a pioneer dawn and, finally, the latest news, which, as usual, began with news from the fields and messages about the achievements of the foremost workers. I thought with dismay: didn’t people in Moscow know that the war had already started several hours ago? Or maybe the actions on the border are regarded as border skirmishes, albeit on a broader scale than those that have taken place over the past weeks? ..

Since the telephone connection was not restored and it was not possible to call Moscow, it was decided to send a message by telegraph about the conversation with Ribbentrop. The coded message was instructed to take Vice-Consul Fomin to the main post office in an embassy car with a diplomatic number. It was our bulky ZIS-101, which was usually used for travel to official receptions. The car drove out of the gate, but 15 minutes later Fomin returned on foot alone. He managed to return only due to the fact that he had a diplomatic card with him. They were stopped by a patrol. The driver and the car were arrested.

In the garage of the embassy, ​​in addition to the "zis" and "emoks", there was a yellow compact car "Opel-Olympia". We decided to use it so that, without attracting attention, to get to the post office and send a telegram. This little operation was designed in advance. After I got behind the wheel, the gates swung open, and the nimble Opel jumped out into the street at full speed. Quickly looking around, I breathed a sigh of relief: there was not a single car near the embassy, ​​and the SS men on foot looked after me in confusion.

It was not possible to hand over the telegram at once. At the main Berlin post office, all the employees stood at the loudspeaker, from where Goebbels' hysterical cries were heard. He said that the Bolsheviks were preparing a stab in the back for the Germans, and the Fuhrer, having decided to move his troops to the Soviet Union, thereby saved the German nation.

I called one of the officials and handed him a telegram. Looking at the address, he exclaimed:

What are you, to Moscow? Haven't you heard what is being done? ..

Without getting into a discussion, I asked to accept the telegram and write out a receipt. Returning to Moscow, we learned that this telegram had never been delivered to its destination ...

When, returning from the post office, I turned from Friedrichstrasse to Unter den Linden, I saw that four khaki cars were standing near the entrance of the embassy. Apparently, the SS have already concluded from their oversight.

In the embassy on the second floor, several people were still at the reception. But the Moscow radio did not mention a word about the incident. Going downstairs, I saw from the office window boys running along the sidewalk, waving special editions of newspapers. I went out the gate and, stopping one of them, bought several publications. The first photographs from the front were already printed there: with pain in our hearts we looked at our Soviet soldiers - wounded, killed ... The report of the German command reported that at night German planes bombed Mogilev, Lvov, Rovno, Grodno and other cities. It was clear that Hitler's propaganda was trying to create the impression that this war would be a short walk ...

Again and again we approach the radio. Folk music and marches are still heard from there. Only at 12 o'clock Moscow time, we heard the statement of the Soviet government:

Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without making any claims to the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country ... Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours.

"... Victory will be ours ... Our cause is just ..." These words were heard from the distant homeland to us, who found ourselves in the very lair of the enemy.

Night at the Museum: Secret of the Tomb Another title: Night at the Museum 3 Director: Sean Levy Writers: David Guyon, Michael Handelman, Mark Friedman, Thomas Lennon , Ben Garant Director: Guillermo Navarro, Composer: Alan Silvestri, Artist: Martin

Night and death. Night and Love In the poem "Menagerie" (1916), dedicated to the war that engulfed Europe, the poet writes about the battle that the peoples entered at the beginning of the 20th century - "at the beginning of an outraged era." This poem echoes Derzhavin's ode To the Taking of Ishmael, where

NIGHT It's not scary during the day. Daytime - light. Everything is as it was: life goes on. Whether there is good and evil in it Or there is no good and evil - The same rhythm and the same course. Wheels creak and paddle lapping, Heavy noise of a truck, The world has not died, has not disappeared: The same caress of the breeze, The same blue sky, Though devoid of miracles ... There is only

XIV. Night It was chilly and cold in the cell. It was pouring from the high, frozen window, and the asphalt floor was wet as if it had been raining. The straw mattress on the iron bunk was incredibly dirty and damp. Reluctantly, I made the bed and, without undressing, lay down under my coat, trying

Night Filimonov, with the means of reinforcement, had long ago broken away from our battalion in the direction of Ivankovo. The battalion, pounding mud, walked along the country road. Behind the black domes of churches, towers of bell towers. Soon they were covered with haze. The wind intensified. But the rain began to subside, there was no rumble

Saturday, June 16th to Friday, June 22nd, 1945. Nothing more significant. And I won't write anything else, time is passing. It was Saturday around 5 pm when the bell rang outside. Widow, I thought. And it turned out to be Gerd, in a civilian dress, brown, hair still

"Silent Night, Holy Night" But it was an air raid alert. American aircraft raid. Lit lanes, searchlights on watchtowers, street lamps, bulbs in all rooms, headlights of cars went out. I realized that I was de-energized and barbed wire who was

LETTER TWO June 19, night You liberate in me my feminine essence, my darkest and most inner being. But this makes me no less clairvoyant. All my sight has a reverse side - blinding. My gentle (the one who makes me ...), all my inseparable

Night of June 22 Saturday June 21 was almost the same as the previous ones, full of alarms from the fleets. Before the weekend, we usually stopped work earlier, but that evening my soul was restless, and I called home: - Don't wait for me, I'll be late. Vera Nikolaevna, my wife,

June 8 - June 14, 1979 This morning we undocked Progress-6, and in the evening we took the Soyuz-34 unmanned spacecraft to the same berth. The need for "Soyuz-34" was due to two reasons. The first was that the Soyuz-32 spacecraft on which we flew